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Introduction 
 
 
Reforming the Eurozone 
without a “Grand Bargain” 
New Instruments and Power-Sharing in Incomplete Monetary Union 
Paweł Tokarski 
Emmanuel Macron’s success in the French presidential elections in May 2017 has given 
fresh impetus to the debate on reforms in the eurozone. However, since there is no 
consensus on fiscal or political integration, the reforms will be limited. Long-discussed 
ideas, such as extending the tasks of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a finance 
minister for the eurozone or the creation of new stabilization instruments within the 
European Union’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), will probably dominate the 
agenda. In addition, negotiations to find a successor for Mario Draghi, President of the 
European Central Bank (ECB), will be conducted over the next two years. Although the 
main elements of the new EU reform package will be brokered between France and 
Germany, both countries must take account of the specific challenges faced by Italy. 
 
The eurozone has not been as stable as it is 
today since the outbreak of the sovereign 
debt crisis in 2010. The economic recovery 
is continuing. Nevertheless, monetary 
union remains very heterogeneous and is 
still plagued by an air of reluctance. Rigid 
labour market structures, toxic credit on 
bank balance sheets, high public debt and a 
tense social situation are all making the 
process of economic recovery more diffi-
cult, particularly in southern Europe. The 
most commonly used indicator of real con-
vergence, per capita growth in gross domes-
tic product (GDP), shows mixed economic 
development in the eurozone. Since the 
introduction of the single currency in 1999, 
per capita GDP has grown much less strong-
ly in southern European countries than, for 
example, in Germany and other eurozone 
countries (see Figure 1, p. 2). In Italy, this 
indicator was actually lower in 2016 than 
in 1999. 
The different economic performance of 
the eurozone countries has an impact on 
the assessment of credit risks. The slow 
pace of normalizing the ECB’s expansionary 
monetary policy will create a “cushion” 
for Italy where elections will take place on 
March 4th 2018. However, unconventional 
monetary policy measures cannot last 
forever and sooner or later Italy’s credit risk 
will be re-evaluated. This also applies to 
Portugal whose debt has exceeded 130% of 
GDP. In July 2017, Greece has succeeded 
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Figure 1 
Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, real growth 1999-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), The Economist. 
Figure 2 
Long-term government bond yields in percent, November 2017 (Eurostat) 
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in selling bonds again for the first time 
since 2014, but the country’s long-term 
economic prospects are uncertain. 
In this context, France’s President Mac-
ron is increasing pressure on Berlin to 
make concrete concessions on eurozone 
fiscal integration. The background to this 
is Macron’s project to ‘reboot’ Europe, in 
which creating a budget and appointing a 
finance minister for the eurozone would 
play a key role. 
However, the number of possible path-
ways to further integration are limited, as 
the European Commission’s May 2017 and 
December 2017 papers show. While there is 
a lack of willingness to mobilize resources 
and share risks in the eurozone, specific 
small-scale reforms could be undertaken 
to strengthen monetary union before the 
next crisis. Some ideas, such as creating the 
post of finance minister for the eurozone, 
may seem ambitious at first. But if they 
were realized, their impact would be 
limited given the current institutional 
and legal limits. 
No fiscal pillar in the eurozone 
The main criticism of eurozone architec-
ture is the lack of fiscal integration. Other 
federations have common shock absorption 
mechanisms in their budgetary frame-
works. In the eurozone, however, stabiliza-
tion is more or less achieved via the back 
door: through Eurosystem interventions 
and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM). But these measures are largely aimed 
at limiting pressure exerted by the finan-
cial markets. A joint eurozone budget could 
help offset economic shocks. Fiscal capacity 
funds could then be spent quickly, prefer-
ably in automated form. The gradual intro-
duction of a common unemployment 
instrument in the eurozone financed by 
the eurozone budget could provide incen-
tives for labour market reforms and legal 
harmonization. Money from fiscal capacity 
should be used to tackle the most urgent 
problems in the south: youth unemploy-
ment and the low labour force participa-
tion of women. 
Instead of having a separate budget for 
the EU-19, it could be integrated into the 
EU budget. After Brexit, those EU Member 
States that are not part of the eurozone will 
account for only 15 percent of EU GDP. This 
raises the question as to whether new euro-
zone instruments, such as the ESM, should 
be created outside the EU framework. Re-
ferring to Article 311 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), the European Parliament’s Com-
mittee on Constitutional Affairs has pub-
lished its opinion on how a group of euro-
zone countries could set new upper limits 
for own resources and introduce new 
categories of own resources. A eurozone 
budget of this kind could be established 
alongside general negotiations on the new 
Multiannual Financial Framework in the 
EU budget. In view of Brexit, EU finances 
are likely to undergo a major transforma-
tion. If non-euro members that fear cuts in 
the EU budget to their detriment were to 
participate, this could make it easier for 
Berlin to reject demands from southern 
eurozone countries to significantly increase 
the eurozone budget. Establishing a euro-
zone budget within the MFF would also put 
pressure on cohesion spending. However, 
non-eurozone net recipients may find it 
easier to accept a eurozone budget as part 
of the MFF than a new budgetary instru-
ment for the EU-19 created outside the EU 
legal framework. 
Moreover, with a budget for the euro-
zone of limited size, it would be almost 
impossible to achieve different goals at 
the same time. Fiscal capacity is unlikely 
to be large enough to adequately mitigate 
against macroeconomic shocks in the 
largest eurozone Member States or to 
provide effective incentives for politically 
costly reforms, largely for political reasons 
and the aversion to permanent financial 
transfers within the eurozone. 
Establishing a eurozone budget could 
significantly strengthen its safety net – 
consisting of the European Stability Mecha-
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nism, the ECB’s monetary policy and 
national economic policy instruments. 
Financial capacity for the eurozone within 
the existing EU budget would also increase 
transparency and strengthen the obligation 
of democratic accountability for this new 
mechanism. However, there is little politi-
cal will among members of the eurozone to 
create such an instrument. The European 
Commission has adopted a more pragmatic 
approach in its December 2017 proposals. 
It suggests reinforcing the stabilizing 
function of the EU budget in various ways, 
for example by creating investment protec-
tion or financial incentives for the reforms. 
More specific ideas will follow in May 2018 
when the Commission presents its proposal 
for the new Multiannual Financial Frame-
work. The fiscal capacity for the EU-19 will 
probably be created by gradually develop-
ing different mechanisms dedicated to the 
eurozone which, at a certain point, will be 
merged under a common umbrella when 
the next political “window of opportunity” 
comes. 
Furthermore, EU finances can also be 
used as extra protection for the eurozone 
in the event of a crisis. The UK has always 
rejected this option. In particular, it con-
cerns the role of the EU budget as collateral 
for the European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism (EFSM). The European Commis-
sion’s reactivation of the EFSM, which is 
still operational, might represent an addi-
tional protective element in monetary 
union. 
Transforming the ESM into 
a European Monetary Fund 
One of the most widely discussed proposals, 
which is also included in the European 
Commission’s December 2017 proposals, 
is the further development of the ESM into 
a kind of European Monetary Fund (EMF). 
Of all the proposals for further developing 
the eurozone, this idea has the greatest 
development potential but should mean 
much more than merely renaming the 
ESM. 
Firstly, the ESM does not have the finan-
cial resources required to provide adequate 
assistance to the largest members of the 
eurozone or a group of member countries. 
With the eurozone currently relatively 
stable, the time is right to introduce some 
changes, such as increasing the capital of 
the ESM or adjusting lending conditions. 
An option might be to limit the scope of 
future financial support packages: As sug-
gested by the Bundesbank, it might be 
possible to reform the collective clauses in 
the terms for government bonds by intro-
ducing an automatic extension of the matu-
rity of government bonds should a euro-
zone Member State receive financial sup-
port from the ESM. This would lead to a 
limiting of required financial assistance 
and cause investors to be more cautious 
when investing in government bonds. 
The eurozone still lacks an effective 
process for sovereign default. After all, a 
scenario in which some members of the 
monetary union are no longer able to repay 
their debts is not inconceivable. The ESM 
seems to be the institution most suited to 
playing a leading role in such a case. For 
example, it could act as an intermediary 
between the country concerned and its 
creditors and provide the necessary finan-
cial support. The ESM could continue to 
play a leading role in formulating and im-
plementing conditions for aid packages. 
The question as to whether sovereign 
insolvency proceedings would take place 
within the monetary union or whether it 
would be associated with an exit from 
this union is significant. After all, it is easy 
to imagine that a country with high debt 
becomes insolvent when it leaves the 
currency union and its new currency is 
devalued as a result. However, the creation 
of a procedure to regulate an orderly exit 
from monetary union would contradict the 
ECB’s assurances that the euro is irreversi-
ble. Such a procedure would also impact 
the effectiveness of future ECB verbal inter-
ventions. 
Many are calling for the ESM/EMF to 
assess the budgetary deficits of eurozone 
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members as objectively and soberly as pos-
sible, based on their economic and fiscal 
situation. However, it is questionable 
whether the ESM/EMF could actually put 
significant pressure on these Member 
States. In addition, a transition from the 
ESM to the EMF would raise the issue of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) parti-
cipation in future European financial 
assistance packages. The developments in 
Greece have shown that IMF involvement 
makes the negotiations more complex. On 
the other hand, the IMF, which has learned 
from past mistakes, now provides more 
realistic assumptions about the develop-
ment of the Greece’s financial situation 
than the European Commission. Its pre-
sence, therefore, as an observer in securing 
and awarding future aid packages remains 
meaningful. At the same time, efforts 
should be made to make the ESM less vul-
nerable to political pressure. 
Economic governance between 
centralization and flexibility 
With a lack of effective economic policy 
integration at the supranational level, the 
new position of finance minister would add 
fuel to old conflicts between the various 
political interests of Member States. It is 
likely that France or Italy would go to great 
lengths to lay claim to the post of finance 
minister. There is also a risk that the new 
finance minister would serve as a scapegoat 
for domestic problems resulting from 
errors in national economic policies. As 
long as the conflict over economic policy 
at EU and national level continues, a euro-
zone finance minister could not fully per-
form his or her tasks. 
Creating common institutions in an area 
as sensitive as economic policy only makes 
sense if more efficient compromises can be 
found in economic policy decisions, which 
all members of monetary union then accept 
and implement. Since such a move would 
entail transferring considerable economic 
policy competences to the supranational 
level, it is unlikely to occur. The best exam-
ple of how the various national interests in 
the eurozone are effectively reconciled is 
the ECB’s Governing Council, which decides 
on monetary policy for the EU-19. However, 
even if it leads to the redistribution of 
wealth, monetary policy causes much less 
controversy at national level than would be 
the case with decisions made by a hypo-
thetical eurozone finance minister, which, 
for example, might lead to pension cuts. 
The fundamental question is, therefore, to 
what extent would it be efficient to central-
ize economic policy-making in a heteroge-
neous economic area such as the eurozone? 
The success stories of Ireland, Finland and 
Portugal after the crisis show that econom-
ic governance through the eurozone is not 
crucial to their success. After all, it is the 
national political establishment and 
national institutions that have to imple-
ment the reforms. 
However, the process of simplifying 
governance in the eurozone should con-
tinue. In December 2017, the European 
Commission proposed merging the posts of 
Vice-President of the European Commission 
and President of the Eurogroup. The euro-
zone’s new super-Commissioner would also 
represent the EU at the G20 and the IMF. 
Although this would simplify economic 
governance of the eurozone, the new posi-
tion cannot be described as “finance minis-
ter of the eurozone”, as this would lead to 
unrealistic expectations. 
In terms of economic governance of the 
eurozone and the future tasks of a euro-
zone finance minister, one of the key ques-
tions is what degree of flexibility should 
apply in implementing the agreed rules. 
Although fiscal regulations have been 
tightened, they are still not respected 
by Member States. None of the large or 
medium-sized economies in the eurozone 
have a sovereign debt level below 60 per-
cent of GDP. Since the beginning of mone-
tary union, France has constantly had 
problems complying with deficit rules. 
Germany has flouted current eurozone 
regulations by consistently ignoring Com-
mission warnings and recommendations 
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Figure 3 
Non-performing loans: Italy, France and Germany, 
as a percentage of all loans, 2010-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bundesbank. 
 
to reduce its persistently excessive current 
account surplus. 
However, the problem is not just about 
fiscal regulations or current account sur-
pluses. An elephant in the room is the 
situation in the banking sector which will 
be the challenge for the current eurozone 
economic governance system. The link 
between taxpayers and banks cannot be 
broken as long as banks are restructured 
and capitalized with public money. Italy, 
the eurozone’s third largest economy, has 
a very high share of non-performing loans 
(NPLs), accounting for 17.1% of total loans. 
This figure is 1.7 percent in Germany and 
3.6 percent in France (see Figure 3). On the 
positive side, the aim of limiting the num-
ber of non-performing loans remains on 
the EU’s political agenda. In July 2017, the 
Council adopted special provisions for non-
performing loans, calling on the Commis-
sion to prepare legislative work on the 
development of secondary markets for NPLs 
or to review the effectiveness of national 
insolvency systems for loans. The creation 
of a ‘bad bank’ that could accelerate and 
simplify bank restructuring would be a 
politically appropriate price to pay. Unless 
the situation in the banking sector im-
proves significantly, the economic situation 
in southern Europe is unlikely to recover 
any time soon. However, if no EU-wide 
solution to the banking problems in Italy 
is sought, such as a ‘bad bank’ for the euro-
zone, current and future Italian govern-
ments will be forced to exploit loopholes in 
the banking union’s legal framework and 
pump public funds into the banking sys-
tem. The result would be a further deterio-
ration of Italy’s public finances. 
Moreover, the third pillar of the banking 
union, the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS), should be finalized. Support 
should be given to Finland’s proposal to 
establish a set of conditions for the EDIS. 
This includes risk mitigation which is to be 
achieved by measuring shares of NPLs or 
government bond holdings against bank 
capital. These measures might encourage 
the countries concerned to address prob-
lems in their banking sectors. 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
SWP Comments 55 
December 2017 
7 
Expected German ‘Takeover’ 
of the ECB 
The issue of what influence Germany has 
and should have on eurozone institutions, 
in particular on its strongest institutional 
actor, the European Central Bank, will be 
raised in the current political cycle. The 
President, the Vice-President and two other 
members of the Executive Board of the ECB 
must be replaced between 2018 and 2019. 
The battle for the ECB’s top positions will 
flare up in 2018, at the same time as the 
discussion on the future of monetary union. 
For the German public, who sees the 
adverse effects of its expansionary mone-
tary policy, having the current Bundesbank 
President assume the highest ECB office 
could be a reassuring signal. In addition, if 
expansionary monetary policy came to an 
end under a new German ECB President, 
this could be communicated as a success 
at the national political level. 
However, such a scenario might also be 
dangerous for Germany: Firstly, this ap-
pointment would strengthen European 
perceptions that Berlin dominates decision-
making in the eurozone. Secondly, in the 
event of a renewed economic downturn, 
Germany would be given primary responsi-
bility for ensuring the survival of the single 
currency. Even if the ECB President were to 
come from Germany, he or she would be in 
a minority position in the ECB’s Governing 
Council and leading a bank involved in 
path dependency. Since the ESM does not 
yet have sufficient financial resources and 
eurozone Member States are not prepared 
to share sovereign debt, in a crisis, the ECB 
will be expected to intervene. Any signs to 
the contrary from Frankfurt would serious-
ly undermine confidence in monetary 
union. As long as there is a lack of fiscal 
integration, the ECB will continue to play a 
dominant role in stabilizing the eurozone. 
What’s more, the ECB may be forced in the 
future, under German leadership, to make 
a judgement on a country’s eurozone parti-
cipation by deciding whether or not to pro-
vide emergency liquidity to banks in that 
country. 
In view of all this, the pros and cons of 
the ECB presidency should be considered 
pragmatically. A central bank president 
from a smaller northern European euro-
zone Member State (such as Finland or a 
Baltic state), backed by a vice-president 
from southern Europe, might be a better 
alternative. 
Outlook 
Germany, which benefits most from the 
single currency because of the strength of 
its exports, would bear the highest costs 
and risks of further integration. The most 
plausible scenario would be for Germany to 
progressively promote fiscal integration in 
parallel with structural reforms in Italy and 
France, as these represent the greatest risk 
to the eurozone in the short and medium 
terms. However, this is and will not be easy. 
The experiences of Italian Prime Minister, 
Matteo Renzi, in his country have shown 
that it is very difficult to keep such large 
and politically unstable economies on track 
for reform. One major problem is society’s 
mistrust of the ‘traditional’ political classes. 
Populists still have a great deal of influence 
in Italy. In addition, among EU-19 mem-
bers, Italy’s population is the most sceptical 
about the benefits of eurozone member-
ship. It is therefore essential in the debate 
on the southern eurozone to persistently 
remind the public of the benefits of the 
single currency and the enormous costs of 
alternative scenarios. 
French President Macron sees labour 
market reforms and fiscal discipline as pre-
requisites for negotiations with Germany 
on greater redistribution and the introduc-
tion of more demand-driven mechanisms 
in the eurozone. Expectations were high, 
especially in Paris, that Berlin would be 
ready for greater flexibility after the gen-
eral elections. After the autumn round of 
the European semester, French budgetary 
policy does not look convincing. Instead of 
declining, its structural balance will dete-
riorate in 2018. The Commission’s assess-
ment of France’s budget for 2018 was that 
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it finds itself at high risk of a non-comp-
liance with the benchmark for debt reduc-
tion in 2018. This weakens France’s posi-
tion in talks with the new government in 
Germany. Coupled with persistently high 
levels of sovereign debt in Italy, this calls 
into question their ability to sustain this 
debt if expansionary monetary policy and 
the current phase of stable economic 
growth come to an end. When the next 
financial crisis hits, the EU’s main anti-
crisis strategy will be based on the ECB’s 
monetary policy instruments. However, it is 
unclear whether these instruments will be 
as effective as they have been previously. 
The most important factor stabilizing the 
eurozone is the conviction of policy-makers 
in all eurozone countries, including Ger-
many, that everything possible must be 
done to maintain the single currency. The 
latest Eurobarometer surveys in December 
2017 show that confidence in the eurozone 
is growing in line with the positive develop-
ment of the economic situation. 
The political situation in Germany will 
have a significant impact on reform ambi-
tions in the eurozone. The collapse of nego-
tiations on a Jamaican coalition could have 
a positive impact on the prospects of euro-
zone reforms. A new grand coalition or 
minority government could simplify the 
creation of room for agreement between 
Paris and Berlin on new investment spend-
ing in the eurozone through a common 
budget and the development of the ESM. 
Much will depend on the extent to which 
the SPD raises eurozone issues in negotia-
tions with the CDU/CSU on a possible 
minority government or grand coalition. 
The fact that Germany is expected to be 
governed by a transitional government 
until February 2018 will put a dampener 
on the debate over reforms. According to 
Donald Tusk’s proposed timetable for the 
leadership agenda, the European Council 
meeting in June 2018 will need to take 
concrete decisions on eurozone reforms.  
However, it is increasingly doubtful if this 
deadline can be met. 
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